Qualia Space

Philosophy · Consciousness

Christian Lains

I am a Norwegian independent researcher and investor, based in the UAE and Thailand. My 2013 master's thesis in philosophy from the University of Oslo asked the following question: what is the difference between conscious and unconscious pattern recognition in perception?

Current Research Master Thesis Contact

Current Research

What is consciousness? Can AIs become conscious? Are they already? What differentiates conscious human perception from unconscious pattern recognition? In my thesis I analyzed perception as intelligent pattern recognition. However, even in humans, unconscious perception works surprisingly well! So given the generality of this intelligence, what can consciousness contribute, and how?

In my work I pursue the answer through the notion of a Qualia Space, in which phenomenal information excludes a structured set of possibilities. This works great, except there is a problem: if these excluded possibilities are not ontologically real, then the phenomenal information is not real — and yet if they are real, what kind of ontological status do we give them?

Consider the “silent neuron” problem: if the neuron could fire, but doesn't, does it contribute to the experience? On a realist interpretation, the answer is yes — but then the possibilities that are excluded determine the phenomenal information. In the years since my master thesis I have come to accept this answer, as there is really no way around it.

My current research takes this implication seriously as Hypermodal Realism. In short: no exclusions = no information; so if the phenomenal exclusions are not ontological, the phenomenal information can't be genuine. Thus, the determination must be reciprocal and ontological — hence hypermodal.

Extended Abstract · Submitted to Consciousness Science 2026 — San Diego

Hypermodal Realism: Phenomenal Information and Excluded Possibilities

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David Lewis formulated the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information in 1988: phenomenal experience can exclude possibilities that physical information leaves open. Lewis' point was exactly to reject this non-physicalist notion. Yet a limited version has gained ground recently. Phenomenal Information Externalism (PIE) claims that systems identical in what they actually do can differ in phenomenal information, because they differ in what they exclude. But excluded by what?

Consider three views: On an epistemic reading, exclusions depend on how states are modeled, not on the states themselves. For the actualist, they stem solely from actual states. Finally, for the modalist, what is excluded are ontologically real possibilities. Both the actualist and the modalist isolate possibilities of the actual state, but the actualist regards them as wholly derivative of its functions and dispositional powers. However, if the actual alone determines the possible, in what real sense can the possible in turn inform the actual?

None, I argue: on an actualist reading, the possibilities cannot individuate in the ontic sense required for experience to be informative. A realist PIE therefore requires Hypermodal Realism: the excluded possibilities must help individuate the actual experience itself; hence Hypermodal. On a stronger reading, if phenomenal information has "phenomenal powers," we get Hypermodal Power Realism: excluded potentials not only individuate the actual but influence it.

Theories of consciousness as different as Integrated Information Theory (IIT), quantum approaches, process philosophy, enactive views, and Dretske's teleofunctional externalism can be read as hypermodal in a broad sense. All look beyond local occurrent activity for the exclusions required for phenomenal information: on teleofunctional accounts, causal history; on enactive accounts, sensorimotor contingencies; on some quantum accounts, real potentiae underlying local actuality; and on IIT, the system's full cause-effect repertoire rather than current activity alone.

Any hypermodal view can be tested like this: hold local activity constant, vary the real possibilities, and check whether the theory predicts a phenomenal difference. In Dretske's teleofunctional externalism, history contributes to the possibilities, so a historyless duplicate (Swampman) would not be conscious. In IIT, clamping a silent but activatable unit leaves local activity unchanged while altering the possibilities, so the theory predicts a phenomenal change.

If phenomenal information is epiphenomenal, the test is hard to carry out: How would we know Swampman is a zombie, if it acts the same? We also face a circularity objection: If we couple the actual and possible too tightly, the distinction may collapse to that of the actualist. Adopting Hypermodal Power Realism, on the other hand, forces the contrast, but requires frameworks in which possible and actual influence each other, arguably favoring quantum or process theories.

If Hypermodal Realism is true, creating artificial consciousness requires more than replicating the brain's computations, functions, or even its actual activity. Consciousness engineering would need to design the right modal configurations, and on the strong reading, the right modal dynamics. "Hypermodal interfaces" could then test the theory by connecting humans across shared spaces of possibility — to one another, to modally rich consciousness-extension devices, and to conscious AIs.

Keywords: consciousness, phenomenal information, excluded possibilities, phenomenal externalism, real potential, hypermodal realism, artificial consciousness

Read the working draft → Talk slides (PDF) · 2026-07-14

Work

Draft · 2026 Hypermodal RealismWorking draft (extended synopsis): phenomenal information, excluded possibilities, and the two deflations. 2013 Perceptual RepresentationContent, constancies and phenomenal consciousness — extract edition with the core passages. Reader Complete Thesis ReaderFull thesis with chapter and page navigation. PDF Original Thesis PDFThe submitted University of Oslo thesis file.